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Eliminating the Distinction Between Sex and
Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Title
VIi's Antiretaliation Provisions
Benjamin Berkmant
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination against employees "because of ... sex."1 Courts
have interpreted the phrase "because . . . of sex" to include
discrimination on the basis of nonconformity with one's gender
but at the same time have excluded discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation from Title VII protection. 2 The result has
been a confused jurisprudence on the relationship of sexual
orientation to Title VII.
Title VII provides both substantive and procedural
protections to workers. To ensure that employees have broad
leeway to pursue Title VII claims, Congress included provisions
proscribing retaliatory action on the part of employers. 3 But
what of the employee who complains of discrimination not
protected by Title VII's substantive provisions, and subsequently
faces retaliatory action? Specifically, what of the employee who
faces retaliation after complaining of discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation? This Comment seeks to answer that
question.
t BA 2012, Northwestern University; JD Candidate 2015, The University of
Chicago Law School. I would like to thank Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos for his
help in developing this Comment.
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 255 (1964), codified at 42 USC
§ 2000e.
2 Compare Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228, 251 (1989) with Dawson v
Bumble & Bumble, 398 F3d 211, 218 (2d Cir 2005).
42 USC § 2000e-3(a); see also Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company
v White, 548 US 53, 63 (2006).
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This topic is ever timely. Amid a national conversation
about the Employment Non-Discrimination Act,4 which would
extend many of Title VII's substantive and procedural
protections to employees who suffer discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, a discussion of the extent of current
protections is crucial. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) rights issues are increasingly at the forefront of our
public discourse, and the role of sexuality in the workplace poses
a difficult and important question.
Indeed, the intersection of employment law and LGBT
rights has garnered significant media attention in recent
months: For example, students at Eastside Catholic High School
in Sammamish, Washington staged a sit-in protest after the
school fired a teacher for marrying his same-sex partner.5 Holy
Ghost Preparatory School in Bensalem, Pennsylvania, has
garnered similar attention for firing a teacher who, along with
his same-sex partner, filed for a marriage license in New
Jersey.6 While there is widespread support for broad laws
protecting LGBT employees from discrimination,7 most of the
public appears to be uncertain or actively misinformed about the
extent of current federal protections. 8 Questions about the
precise scope of legal rights afforded to LGBT individuals are
central to our national political discussion.
A clear answer to this question will benefit employees and
employers alike. Clarity will allow employees to make informed
choices about what behavior they choose to complain about.
Moreover, clarity will allow employers to craft employment
4 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S 815, 113th Cong, 1st Sess (Nov
12, 2013), online at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s815/text (visited Oct 18,
2014).
Joel Connelly, Eastside Catholic students protest diocese-ordered resignation,
Seattle Post Intelligencer Blog, (Seattle Post Intelligencer Dec 19, 2013), online at
http: //blog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/20 13/12/19/eastside-catholic-students-protest-
diocese-ordered-resignation/#19056101=0 (visited Oct 18, 2014).
6 Hunter Stuart, Holy Ghost Preparatory Teacher Allegedly Fired for Getting Gay
Marriage License: Report, Huffington Post (Dec 7, 2013), online at http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/07/holy-ghost-teacher-fired-n_4405039.html (visited Oct 18,
2014).
See Alex Lundry, Voters in Both Parties Back Workplace Equality for Gays, CNN
(CNN Oct 22, 2013), online at http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/22/opinion/lundry-
nondiscrimination-gay-workers/ (visited Oct 18, 2014).
8 Katie Jagel, Poll Results: Gay Rights, YouGov/Huffington Post (YouGov Oct 31,
2013), online at https: //today.yougov.com/news/2013/10/3 1/poll-results-gay-rights/
(visited Oct 18, 2014).
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policies that accurately reflect federal law. Finally, a clear rule
will allow employers to be secure in their knowledge that a
particular course of conduct will or will not lead to meritorious
litigation against them. On both ends of the spectrum, a clear
answer about the rights of LGBT employees facing retaliation
lets the involved parties know, ex ante, the consequences of their
actions.
This Comment maintains that, for the purposes of Title VII
retaliation claims, courts ought to eliminate the distinction
between complaints about sexual orientation discrimination and
sex discrimination. This formulation is most consistent with the
Supreme Court's recent pronouncements about the meaning and
purpose of Title VII's antiretaliation provision. Moreover, this
framework effectively accounts for the inherently blurred line
between proscribed discrimination on the basis of "gender
nonconformity" and permitted discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.
In Part I, this Comment will first go over Title VII,
explaining the scope of its substantive and procedural
protections. Then, it will explore a circuit split between the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits on the one hand, and the Ninth
Circuit on the other, in determining whether Title VII's
retaliation provisions contemplate employees who complain
about discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In Part
II, this Comment will explain why courts ought to eliminate the
distinction between sex and sexual orientation in this context,
with a focus on recent Supreme Court precedent suggesting a
broad construction of Title VII's antiretaliation provisions.
I. TITLE VII, RETALIATION, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
President Kennedy proposed what eventually became the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a response to rampant inequity and
discrimination that pervaded, and continues to pervade,
American society.9 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was
9 See John F. Kennedy, Report to the American People on Civil Rights, 11 June
1963 (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum), online at
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/LH8FOMzvOe6RolyEm74Ng.aspx (visited Oct
18, 2014) ("One hundred years of delay have passed since President Lincoln freed the
slaves, yet their heirs, their grandsons, are not fully free. They are not yet freed from the
bonds of injustice. They are not yet freed from social and economic oppression. . . . Next
week I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a commitment it has
not fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life
533] 535
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
specifically designed to combat inequalities in the workplace,
where "[d]iscrimination against black employees was often
accompanied by direct instances of racial animus."10 Indeed,
"[t]he passage of Title VII reflected an ambitious attempt to
transform society by eradicating discrimination based on
protected characteristics and to promote facially neutral decision
making and status-blind employment practices.""
A. Substantive Protections under Title VII
Title VII protects against discrimination on the basis of sex
in the workplace. Nonetheless, legislative history is scant about
the meaning of "sex" or why "sex" was included in the law to
begin with. 12 The "sex" language was added to the bill that
became the Civil Rights Act via an amendment on the day
before it passed the House of Representatives. 13 Some accounts
maintain that the authors of the amendment added the "sex"
language in an attempt to kill the bill, believing that Congress
would not vote to enact such broad protections for women.14
Nonetheless, both the amendment and the underlying bill
quickly passed.15 The text of Title VII's substantive provision
reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
or law.").
10 Damon Ritenhouse, A Primer on Title VII: Part One, ABA GPSolo eReport (ABA
Jan 2013), online at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gpsolo-ereport/2013/
january_2013/primer title vii-part one.html (visited Oct 18, 2014).
1 Id.
12 Mertor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 63-64 (1986) ("The prohibition
against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor
of the House of Representatives. . . . [W]e are left with little legislative history to guide
us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex."').
1s See Diaz v Pan American World Airways, Inc, 442 F2d 385, 386 (5th Cir 1971).
14 See, for example, Barnes v Costle, 561 F2d 983, 987 (DC Cir 1977) ("It was offered
as an addition to other proscriptions by opponents in a last-minute attempt to block the
bill which became the Act.").
1" Id at 987.
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applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 16
This text outlines the precise substantive limits Title VII
places on employer discrimination.
As a textual matter, 42 USC § 2000e-2 affords no protection
to individuals who claim that their employer has discriminated
against them on the basis of sexual orientation. 17 For example,
in Simonton u Runyon, 18 the Second Circuit considered an
archetypal sexual orientation discrimination case: Simonton
faced a barrage of comments, notes, and pictures aggressively
targeting his homosexuality.19 This abuse caused Simonton to
have a heart attack and he subsequently filed suit, alleging
discrimination in violation of Title VII.20 The court rejected his
claim, noting that "[t]he law is well-settled in this circuit and in
all others to have reached the question that Simonton has no
cause of action under Title VII because Title VII does not
prohibit harassment or discrimination because of sexual
orientation." 2 1 At the crux of the court's ruling was the
consistent congressional consideration and rejection of laws
designed to expand substantive employment discrimination
protections to cover sexual orientation; if such laws are
consistently proposed, the court asserts, then existing law must
not contemplate discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. 22
16 42 USC § 2000e-2.
17 Simonton u Runyon, 232 F3d 33, 35 (2d Cir 2000). The Senate recently passed the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which would prohibit employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Nonetheless, ENDA has not yet passed
the House, and its future remains uncertain. See Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Approves
Ban on Antigay Bias in Workplace, NY Times (NY Times Nov 7, 2013), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/us/politics/senate-moves-to-final-vote-on-workplace-
gay-bias-ban.html~hp&_r 0 (visited Oct 14, 2014).
18 232 F3d 33 (2d Cir 2000).
19 Simonton, 232 F3d at 35.
20 Id at 34-35.
21 Id at 35.
22 Id ("Although congressional inaction subsequent to the enactment of a statute is
not always a helpful guide, Congress's refusal to expand the reach of Title VII is strong
evidence of congressional intent in the face of consistent judicial decisions refusing to
interpret 'sex' to include sexual orientation.").
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Nonetheless, the term "sex" in 42 USC § 2000e-2 has been
construed to encompass individuals who face discrimination
based on their non-gender conforming behavior. 23 For example,
in Price Waterhouse v Hopkins,24 the Supreme Court ruled that
Price Waterhouse violated Title VII when it denied a female
employee a promotion because she was too aggressive, which the
partners did not deem "feminine."25 The Court noted that under
a construction of Title VII more forgiving of the employer,
female employees would be in a "catch 22" of sorts: An employer
may have a position that requires aggressiveness, but at the
same time object to that trait in women. 26 This places women in
the unenviable position of being "out of a job if they behave
aggressively and out of a job if they do not."2 7 Title VII's
prohibition of discrimination based on gender nonconformity
"lifts women out of this bind."2 8 Moreover, Title VII applies with
the same force to a man facing discrimination for gender
nonconformity that it does to a woman facing equivalent
discrimination. 2 9
There is an apparent paradox between the broad protection
afforded to gender non-conforming individuals and the lack of
protection afforded to those discriminated against on the basis of
sexual orientation. 30 Discrimination on the basis of sexual
23 Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 251, quoting Los Angeles Department of Water &
Power u Manhart, 435 US 702, 707 n 13 ("As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping,
we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for [in forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from
sex stereotypes."').
24 490 US 228 (1989).
21 Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 235 ("But it was the man who, as Judge Gesell
found, bore responsibility for explaining to Hopkins the reasons for the Policy Board's
decision to place her candidacy on hold who delivered the coup de grace: in order to
improve her chances for partnership, Thomas Beyer advised, Hopkins should 'walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry."') (emphasis removed).
26 Id at 251.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Oncale u Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc, 523 US 75, 78 (1998), citing Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co u EEOC, 462 US 669, 682 (1983) ("Title VII's
prohibition of discrimination 'because of ... sex' protects men as well as women"). See
also Nichols u Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc, 256 F3d 864, 874 ("Sanchez contends
that the holding in Price Waterhouse applies with equal force to a man who is
discriminated against for acting too feminine. We agree.").
so See Birkholz u City of New York, 2012 WL 580522, *8 (EDNY). See also
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orientation is, after all, discrimination based upon an
incongruity between the way in which men and women are
traditionally expected to act and the way an individual actually
acts. 31 As one district court recently put it, "[a] homosexual male
exhibiting an attraction toward other males in the workplace
would not be behaving as a man would stereotypically be
expected to behave." 32 Subsequently, the lack of protection
afforded to those who suffer from workplace discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation is difficult to square with Price
Waterhouse's broad protections for victims of gender non-
conformity discrimination.
In light of this difficulty, courts have had to walk a fine line
to ensure that plaintiffs do not "bootstrap" discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation into the realm of Title VII protection
using the gender nonconformity theory. 33 Such "bootstrapping"
may occur when plaintiffs assert legal theories that
misrepresent the law in an attempt to garner broader
substantive protections. On the other hand, the substantive
differences between discrimination based on sexual orientation
and discrimination based on gender nonconformity can
occasionally be bridged by effective presentation. 34 Despite these
blurred lines, it remains settled law that Title VII affords no
explicit protection to individuals discriminated against on the
basis of sexual orientation. 35
B. Retaliation under Title VII
Title VII protects both those who have suffered from certain
forms of discrimination, and those who face retaliatory action
Henderson u Labor Finders of Virginia, Inc, 2013 WL 1352158, *4 (ED VA).
s See Birkholz, 2012 WL 580522 at *8. See also Henderson, 2013 WL 1352158 at
*4.
32 Henderson, 2013 WL 1352158 at *4.
" See, for example, Dawson u Bumble & Bumble, 398 F3d 211, 218 (2d Cir 2005)
(citations and internal quotations omitted) ("When utilized by an avowedly homosexual
plaintiff, however, gender stereotyping claims can easily present problems for an
adjudicator. This is for the simple reason that [s]tereotypical notions about how men and
women should behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about heterosexuality and
homosexuality. Like other courts, we have therefore recognized that a gender
stereotyping claim should not be used to bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into
Title VII.").
34 See Kristin M. Bovalino, How the Effeminate Male Can Maximize His Odds of
Winning Title VII Litigation, 53 Syracuse L Rev 1117, 1130-33 (2003).
" Simonton, 232 F3d at 35.
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after complaining about such discrimination or participating in
a Title VII investigation. 36 As to the latter, the relevant portion
of Title VII reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or
applicants for employment. . . . Because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.37
An employee need not actually be discriminated against to
receive Title VII protection; mere opposition to illegal
discrimination in the workplace, or participation in a Title VII
investigation (the meaning of "investigation" is discussed below)
confers some quantum of protection to an individual employee. 38
That precise quantum of protection is, however, hotly debated. 39
Despite the lack of explicit substantive protection afforded
to them, individuals facing discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation may choose to file complaints with human resources,
in court or with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).40 There are a number of explanations for
this course of action: An employee may not understand the finer
points of federal employment law, they may be confused about
the distinction between "gender nonconformity" discrimination
and "sexual orientation" discrimination, or they may believe
their employer will take action irrespective of the content of the
law. Because of the lack of substantive protections for victims of
sexual orientation discrimination, any formal complaints filed
presumably will fail.4 1 After lodging her complaint, an employee
may face retaliation from her employer for her participation in
42 USC § 2000e-3(a).
42 USC § 2000e-3(a).
42 USC § 2000e-3(a).
39 Compare Hamner u St Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center, Inc, 224 F3d
701, 707-08 (7th Cir 2000), with Birkholz, 2012 WL 580522 at *8.
40 See, for example, Gilbert u Country Music Association, Inc, 432 F Appx 516, 519-
20 (6th Cir 2011).
41 See, for example, Simonton 232 F3d at 34-35.
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the complaint or subsequent investigation. 4 2 Such retaliation is
unlawful under 42 USC § 2000e-3 if the employee "opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter."43
The Supreme Court has divided this language into two
distinct clauses: the "opposition" clause and the "participation"
clause.44 The opposition clause protects an employee who speaks
out against activity made unlawful by 42 USC § 2000e-2; it
applies both where the employee has initiated the opposition,
and where the employee speaks out against unlawful
discrimination as a response to a question or an investigation. 45
On the other hand, the participation clause is more formalistic. 4 6
Though the language "participated in any manner" is broader
than "oppose," the participation clause exclusively refers to
participation in any formally established Title VII
investigation. 4 In defining "investigation," courts have
preferred a narrow construction that excludes the employer's
internal investigations. 4 8 As the Ninth Circuit explains, an
employee is only protected via the participation clause where the
"employee[] participat[es] in the machinery set up by Title VII
to enforce its provisions."4 9
42 Id.
43 42 USC § 2000e-3(a).
44 Crawford v Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County,
Tennessee, 555 US 271, 280 (2009).
45 Id.
46 See, for example, EEOC v Total System Services, Inc, 221 F3d 1171, 1174 (11th
Cir 2000).
47 Id ("This clause protects proceedings and activities which occur in conjunction
with or after the filing of a formal charge with the EEOC; it does not include
participating in an employer's internal, in-house investigation, conducted apart from a
formal charge with the EEOC.").
48 See Townsend v Benjamin Enterprises, Inc, 697 F3d 41, 49 (2d Cir 2012) (internal
citation omitted) ("Every Court of Appeals to have considered this issue squarely has
held that participation in an internal employer investigation not connected with a formal
EEOC proceeding does not qualify as protected activity under the participation
clause.... The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have also suggested
that, for conduct to be protected by the participation clause, it must occur in connection
with a formal EEOC proceeding.").
49 Silver v KCA, Inc, 586 F2d 138, 140 (9th Cir 1978).
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Hence, despite the broader language of the participation
clause, it is narrower in scope than the opposition clause.50 For
example, an employee who only speaks to his boss about alleged
discrimination would only receive protection under the
opposition clause because he has not taken part in any formal
Title VII investigation. On the contrary, an employee who files a
formal complaint with the EEOC would receive the full
protection of the participation clause because he is operating
within the "machinery" of Title VII.
C. Differences Between Title VII's Substantive and Retaliation
Provisions
There are key differences between a retaliation claim
brought pursuant to 42 USC § 2000e-3, and a substantive
discrimination claim brought pursuant to 42 USC § 2000e-2.
First, the standard of causation used in retaliation cases is "but-
for" causation, while courts hearing traditional discrimination
cases need only ask if the unlawful discrimination was a
"motivating factor" in the adverse employment decision.51
Essentially, in retaliation cases, plaintiffs must demonstrate
that their employer would not have taken adverse action against
them if the employer were not unlawfully retaliating. 52
Second, the Supreme Court has identified a difference in
purpose, and subsequently a difference in mechanics, between
the two provisions. In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Company v White, 53 the Court explained that "[t]he substantive
provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on who
they are, i.e., their status. The antiretaliation provision seeks to
prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their
5o Id.
5' University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center u Nassar, 133 S Ct 2517, 2532
(2013) ("Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of
but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in § 2000e-2(m). This requires
proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged
wrongful action or actions of the employer."). Prior to Nassar, it was unclear whether
retaliation claims required "but-for" causation. Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1991, partially in response to the unclear causation framework the Court established in
Price Waterhouse. See 42 USC § 2000e-2(m). While the statute makes it clear that the
less demanding "motivating factor" analysis applies to traditional discrimination cases,
the Nassar court held that it does not apply to retaliation cases.
52 Nassar, 133 S Ct at 2532 (2013).
548 US 53 (2006).
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conduct."5 4 In declaring the "primary purpose" of Title VII's
antiretaliation provisions to be "maintaining unfettered access
to statutory remedial mechanisms," the Court recognized that
"conduct" may be entitled to broader protection than "status"
under Title VII.55
The Court made this pronouncement in the context of a
limitation stipulating that an employer's behavior must be
"employment-related" to give rise to Title VII liability.56
Burlington Northern concerned a female railroad worker whose
responsibilities were made more difficult after she complained to
her employer of sexual harassment57 The Court sought to
identify how severe an employer's retaliatory action must be
before the affected employee has a colorable Title VII claim.5 8 It
ruled in favor of the employee, noting that retaliation claims do
not require an alteration of the "terms or conditions" of
employment (as meritorious claims under Title VII's substantive
provisions do); rather, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that the
retaliatory action would have "dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."5 9
Essentially, the Court explained that the antiretaliation
provision's aim to provide "unfettered access" to Title VII's
remedial mechanisms required broader constraints on employer
behavior under Title VII's antiretaliation provision than are
provided for under its substantive provisions.60
The Court remained silent as to whether the class of
employees protected is broader in the retaliation provision than
it is in the substantive provisions.6 1 Nonetheless, language from
14 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v White, 548 US 53, 63
(2006).
Id at 64-66 ("We do not accept petitioner's and the Solicitor General's view that it
is 'anomalous' to read the statute to provide broader protection for victims of retaliation
than for those whom Title VII primarily seeks to protect, namely, victims of race-based,
ethnic-based, religion-based, or gender-based discrimination. Congress has provided
similar kinds of protection from retaliation in comparable statutes without any judicial
suggestion that those provisions are limited to the conduct prohibited by the primary
substantive provisions.").
1 Id at 61-62 (2006).
1 Id at 57-59 (2006).
" Burlington Northern, 548 US at 59-61.
'9 Id at 67-68.
60 Id at 66.
61 Id at 61-67.
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Burlington Northern suggests a broad construction of all of Title
VII's antiretaliation elements:
Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the
cooperation of employees who are willing to file
complaints and act as witnesses. Plainly, effective
enforcement could thus only be expected if employees felt
free to approach officials with their grievances.
Interpreting the antiretaliation provision to provide
broad protection from retaliation helps ensure the
cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act's
primary objective depends. 62
In so many words, the Burlington Northern Court feared a
chilling effect if Title VII's antiretaliation provisions were
interpreted narrowly: individuals, fearing retaliation, would be
more reticent to complain about discrimination or file charges. 63
A broad construction, according the Court, mitigates that
concern.64
Third, the Court has, in recent years, expanded the class of
individuals who may bring retaliation claims under Title VII.65
In Thompson v North American Stainless, LP,66 the Supreme
Court applied a "zone of interests" analysis to determine
whether a particular plaintiff is entitled to file a retaliation
claim under Title VII. 67 The unanimous opinion noted, in
discussing the word "aggrieved" in Title VII, that:
We have held that this language establishes a regime
under which a plaintiff may not sue unless he "falls
within the 'zone of interests' sought to be protected by the
statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis
for his complaint." We have described the "zone of
interests" test as denying a right of review "if the
plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute
that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress
62 Burlington Northern, 548 US at 67.
63 Id.
64 Id.
6 Thompson u North American Stainless, LP, 131 S Ct 863, 870 (2011).
66 Id.
6 Id at 870.
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intended to permit the suit." We hold that the term
"aggrieved" in Title VII incorporates this test, enabling
suit by any plaintiff with an interest "arguably [sought]
to be protected by the statutes."68
Under this framework, the Court permitted an individual to
sue for retaliation when he was terminated after his fianc6e
filed a claim alleging that their common employer discriminated
against her on the basis of sex. 69 The Court's analysis suggests
that the purpose of Title VII is probative in determining
whether an individual is within the "zone of interests" protected
by the law. 70 The Court's ruling in Thompson necessarily means
that some Title VII retaliation cases will be permitted to go
forward, even when the employee claiming retaliation was not
the initial victim of an employer's unlawful discrimination.7 1
D. Circuit Split
Circuits are split as to whether Title VII's opposition clause
prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who
complain of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.72
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits maintain that an individual
may not bring a retaliation claim when the discrimination
complained of is solely based on sexual orientation. 73 The Ninth
Circuit permits such causes of action.74
The Sixth Circuit announced its formulation in Gilbert v
Country Music Association, Inc. 75 Gilbert complained to his
union that he had been threatened by another union member
who "called him a 'faggot' and threatened to stab him." 76 The
court determined that Gilbert complained only of sexual
68 Id (internal citations omitted).
69 Thompson, 131 S Ct at 870.
70 Id ("Thompson was an employee of NAS, and the purpose of Title VII is to protect
employees from their employers' unlawful actions.").
71 Id.
72 Compare Gilbert u Country Music Association, Inc, 432 F Appx 516, 519-20 (6th
Cir 2011), and Hamner, 224 F3d at 707-08, with Dawson u Emtek International, 630 F3d
928, 936-38 (9th Cir 2011).
7 See Gilbert 432 Fed Appx at 519-20; see also Hamner, 224 F3d at 707-08.
74 Dawson u Emtek International, 630 F3d 928, 936-38 (9th Cir 2011).
7 432 F Appx 516 (6th Cir 2011).
76 Gilbert, 432 Fed Appx at 518.
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orientation discrimination, which is unprotected by Title VII.77
Based on that finding, the court concluded that "[b]ecause the
conduct Gilbert opposed was not an 'unlawful employment
practice,' his retaliation claims must also fail."7 8 This is the
extent of the court's reasoning; it held, with little analysis, that
all retaliation claims brought under the opposition clause must
be based on a practice proscribed by 42 USC § 2000e-2. 79
The Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion. In
Hamner u St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc,8 0 the
plaintiff was a hospital employee who complained of sexual
harassment.8 1 The plaintiff, in direct examination, stated: "It
was merely the fact that because I am gay, because that just is
who I am, he was opposed to that and he absolutely could not
handle that. And, so, it was constant harassment because of my
sexual orientation."82 From this, the court concluded that the
plaintiff had suffered only discrimination on the basis of his
sexual orientation and not discrimination on the basis of sex.83
Nonetheless, the court discussed the possibility that an
individual could bring a retaliation claim under Title VII
without having suffered from unlawful discrimination pursuant
to 42 USC § 2000e-2. 84 The court applied a two-part test: First,
it asked if the Title VII plaintiff had a subjective belief that she
was complaining about an unlawful practice. 85 Second, it asked
if that belief was objectively reasonable.86 Though the court
recognized that "an employee may engage in statutorily
protected expression under section 2000e-3(a) even if the
challenged practice does not actually violate Title VII," it framed
this as a matter of degree rather than a question of the form of
substantive discrimination at issue.87 According to the court, a
Title VII retaliation claim is sustainable if the alleged
substantive discrimination is sex discrimination, even if the
7 Id at 520.
78 Id.
79 Id at 519-21.
80 224 F3d 701 (7th Cir 2000).
8' Hamner, 224 F3d at 705.
82 Id.
8 Id at 706.
84 Id at 706-07.
8' Hamner, 224 F3d at 706-07.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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severity of the employer's discrimination would not give rise to
liability under Title VII's substantive provisions.88 The court will
allow a plaintiff's retaliation claim to go forward if the type of
alleged discrimination is one explicitly contemplated by Title VII
(even if the substantive claim would fail). But if the alleged
substantive discrimination is of a type not contemplated by Title
VII, the employee's retaliation claim must fail.89 The Court
determined that though the plaintiff believed he was
complaining about proscribed sex discrimination, that belief
could not have been objectively reasonable because Title VII
affords no protection to those facing discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation.90
On the contrary, in Dawson u Entek International,91 the
Ninth Circuit permitted a Title VII retaliation case to go
forward, while at the same time concluding that the
discrimination the plaintiff complained of was unprotected
sexual orientation discrimination. 92 The plaintiff was fired less
than forty-eight hours after complaining to human resources
about sexual orientation discrimination. 93 The court, in
permitting the plaintiffs retaliation claim to go forward, posited
that, "Dawson engaged in protected activity when he visited
Morch in human resources to discuss his treatment and file a
complaint. This was a complaint to human resources staff based
directly on sexual orientation discrimination." 9 4 Much like the
Sixth Circuit, the court came to its conclusion with little
analysis.95 The court provides no reason why the plaintiff's
88 Id.
89 Hamner, 224 F3d at 706-07 ("[E]ven if the degree of discrimination does not
reach a level where it affects the terms and conditions of employment, if the employee
complains and the employer fires him because of the complaint, the retaliation claim
could still be valid. But the complaint must involve discrimination that is prohibited by
Title VII. The plaintiff must not only have a subjective (sincere, good faith) belief that he
opposed an unlawful practice; his belief must also be objectively reasonable, which
means that the complaint must involve discrimination that is prohibited by Title VII.
Sexual orientation is not a classification that is protected under Title VII; thus
homosexuals are not members of a protected class under the law.").
90 Id at 706-07.
91 630 F3d 928 (9th Cir 2011).
92 Dawson, 630 F3d at 936-38 (concluding that the plaintiff's retaliation claim
presented a genuine issue of material fact, while at the same time affirming the district
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs sex discrimination claim under 42 USC § 2000e-2).
93 Dawson, 630 F3d at 936.
94 Id (emphasis added).
95 Id at 936-38.
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complaint about sexual orientation discrimination constituted
"protected activity." It merely treated this proposition as a
foregone conclusion. Nonetheless, despite a lack of substantial
analysis, it is clear that the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is at odds
with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits' frameworks.96
E. A Broader Question?
In one sense, this issue is not specific to sexual
orientation.97  One could fathom dozens of forms of
discrimination employees may encounter that remain untouched
by Title VII.98 Perhaps we need to ask a broader question: To
what extent does 42 USC § 2000e-3(a) encompass complaints
about forms of discrimination not contemplated by 42 USC
§ 2000e-2? The Sixth Circuit likely answers this by refusing to
allow any retaliation claims to go forward in the absence of a
colorable § 2000e-2 claim.99 The Seventh Circuit, on the other
hand, does not wholesale reject all such claims.100 Rather, the
Hamner court posited that a complaint about sex discrimination
can still give rise to a retaliation claim even if the actions taken
against the employee were not severe enough to create § 2000e-2
liability.101 The court framed the issue as one of severity rather
than form. 102
Other courts have taken different approaches. As evidenced
by the Dawson decision, the Ninth Circuit permits such cases to
go forward in some instances. 103 They operate under a
formulation similar to, but less demanding than, the Seventh
Circuit's framework.104 While the Ninth Circuit similarly
requires an employee to have an objectively reasonable belief
that their employer engaged in unlawful conduct, the line of
reasonableness is not drawn at the outer limits of Title VII's
96 Compare Dawson, 630 F3d at 936-38, with Hamner 224 F3d at 705-07 (7th Cir
2000), and Gilbert, 432 Fed Appx at 519-20.
97 See, for example, Moyo u Gomez, 32 F3d 1382, 1385-86 (9th Cir 1994).
98 Id.
99 Gilbert, 432 F Appx at 519-20.
100 Hamner, 224 F3d at 706-07.
101 Id.
102 Id.
'0 Dawson, 630 F3d at 936-38.
104 Id.
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substantive provisions.105 The Second Circuit similarly eschews
the Seventh Circuit's focus on severity as opposed to form: "the
plaintiff need not establish that the conduct she opposed was
actually a violation of Title VII, but only that she possessed a
'good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying employment
practice was unlawful' under that statute."106 The court further
stated that "[t]he reasonableness of the plaintiff's belief is to be
assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances."o7
Indeed, at least one district court in the Second Circuit has
come to the opposite conclusion of the Seventh Circuit in
Hamner. In Birkholz v City of New York,108 the plaintiff asserted
that he faced gender nonconformity discrimination "motivated
by the stereotype 'that a homosexual is more likely to
be a pedofile [sic]."' 109 The Eastern District of New York rejected
the idea that this constituted discrimination based on gender
nonconformity but nonetheless allowed the plaintiff's retaliation
claim to go forward. 110 The court determined that not permitting
the retaliation claim to go forward would undermine one of the
fundamental purposes of Title VII's retaliation provisions:
The court notes that a necessary consequence of
encouraging "unfettered access" to Title VII's remedial
mechanisms is that not all complaints or charges of
discrimination will be legally sustainable. However, the
court also believes that the reality that some complaints
are not legally sustainable does not license employers to
retaliate in ways that would undermine the goal of
unfettered access. . . . The ostensible difference between
gender stereotyping and sexual-orientation-based
'o' See Moyo, 32 F3d at 1385-86 ("[E]ven if the inmates in this case did not qualify
as "employees" under Title VII, Moyo would be able to state a retaliation claim if he
could show that his belief that an unlawful employment practice occurred (i.e., that the
inmates were employees protected by Title VII) was otherwise 'reasonable'. The
reasonableness of Moyo's belief that an unlawful employment practice occurred must be
assessed according to an objective standard-one that makes due allowance, moreover,
for the limited knowledge possessed by most Title VII plaintiffs about the factual and
legal bases of their claims. We note again that a reasonable mistake may be one of fact or
law.").
1o Galdieri-Ambrosini v National Realty & Development Corp, 136 F3d 276, 292 (2d
Cir 1998).
107 Id (emphasis added).
10 2012 WL 580522 (EDNY 2012).
109 Birkholz, 2012 WL 580522 at *6 (EDNY 2012).
n0 Id at *8.
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discrimination is that the former is motivated by the
employer's animus towards the employee's outward
behavior, the latter by the employee's sexual preference.
Courts have candidly recognized the analytical
difficulties this creates, as "stereotypical notions about
how men and women should behave will often necessarily
blur into ideas about heterosexuality and
homosexuality.... If opposition to sexual-orientation-
based discrimination was not protected activity,
employees subjected to gender stereotyping would have
to base their decision to oppose or not oppose unlawful
conduct on a brittle legal distinction, a situation that
might produce a chilling effect on gender stereotyping
claims.'
In coming to this conclusion, the district court relied on the
Supreme Court's Burlington Northern formulation, calling for a
broad interpretation of the antiretaliation provision to comport
with Congress' purpose in enacting it.112
II. ELIMINATING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SEX AND
ORIENTATION IN TITLE VII's ANTIRETALIATION PROVISIONS
There appears to be a dearth of academic discussion on this
issue, as the circuit split is relatively new. While one article has
considered the extent to which Title VII's retaliation provisions
protect those who complain of sexual orientation discrimination,
it does so only briefly, as part of a broader paper on
retaliation. 113 Moreover, this article predates Burlington
Northern, a case that fundamentally alters the lens through
which courts must view retaliation claims. This Comment posits
that the best rule is one that eliminates the distinction between
discrimination on the basis of sex and discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation for purposes of evaluating the
"reasonableness" of a plaintiff's subjective belief that his
n1 Id.
112 Id. See also Burlington Northern 548 US at 63 ("The antiretaliation provision
seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering
(through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the
Act's basic guarantees. The substantive provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals
based on who they are, i.e., their status. The antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent
harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.").
ns Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 Minn L Rev 18, 93 (2005).
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employer has engaged in unlawful discrimination pursuant to
Title VII.
A. Consistency with Burlington Northern
First, only a per se elimination of the distinction between
sex and sexual orientation is consistent with the Burlington
Northern Court's declaration of Title VII's purpose. If indeed
"effective enforcement could... [o]nly be expected if employees
felt free to approach officials with their grievances,"114 then an
acceptable rule cannot hinge on a distinction as blurred as the
one between discrimination on the basis of sex and
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Even making
the deliberately incorrect assumption that all employees have a
strong understanding of finer points of employment law, a rule
that fails to protect those claiming discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation would create a chilling effect on complaints
about discrimination made unlawful by Title VII's substantive
provisions. Employees who understand the distinction made by
the law may choose to not file charges or complain to superiors
for fear of lawful retaliation, should it turn out that their claim
was based on sexual orientation as opposed to gender
nonconformity. 115
It is no secret that even employees who suffer from
discrimination value their employment. The possibility that an
individual may lose her job because her complaint fit into one
rather than the other of two overwhelmingly similar categories
undoubtedly serves as an effective deterrent to making such
complaints. This is precisely the danger that the Burlington
Northern Court sought to avoid. 116 Indeed, this argument is not
about extending substantive protections to individuals who
suffer from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. It
is about ensuring that those who arguably have cognizable
claims under Title VII's substantive provisions will pursue those
claims. Only a rule that eliminates the distinction between
sex/gender nonconformity discrimination and sexual orientation
discrimination in evaluating retaliation claims comports with
what the Burlington Northern court describes as 42 USC
114 Burlington Northern, 548 US at 67.
n. See Birkholz, 2012 WL 580522, *8 (referring to a "chilling effect").
n1 Burlington Northern, 548 US at 67.
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§ 2000e-3(a)'s primary purpose: "Maintaining unfettered access
to statutory remedial mechanisms."1 17
Critics may assert that this argument misapplies
Burlington Northern. They may argue that because Burlington
Northern only considered the more formalistic question of
whether an employer's conduct must be "employment-related" to
give rise to Title VII retaliation liability, courts ought not extend
its findings to the more substantive question of which employees
are covered. 118 This argument ignores the language of
Burlington Northern. The Court consistently describes the
purposes of Title VII's retaliation provisions broadly; it does not
limit its discussion to the question of relation to employment.
For example, the Court wrote: "Interpreting the antiretaliation
provision to provide broad protection from retaliation helps
ensure the cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act's
primary objective depends,""1 and "[ti]he antiretaliation
provision seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing
an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an
employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's
basic guarantees." 12 0 The Court does not couch its language. It
refers broadly to the purpose of the antiretaliation provision in
its entirety. It makes no disclaimer about the application of such
purposes to other elements of a retaliation claim. Hence, any
criticisms based on factual differences between the instant
question and Burlington Northern are unfounded.
Additionally, critics may note that nothing in the text of
Title VII suggests that the types of discrimination contemplated
by Title VII's antiretaliation provisions are broader than those
explicitly covered by its substantive provisions. In this view, the
Hamner court is correct in declaring that though a retaliation
claim can succeed where a substantive claim is unsustainable, a
retaliation claim must fail where the substantive claim is of a
type not contemplated by the statute. 121 The language of
Burlington Northern does not bear this interpretation. The
Court explicitly rejected the view that it is "anomalous to read
the statute to provide broader protection for victims of
117 Id at 55.
11s Burlington Northern, 548 US at 61-62.
119 Id at 67 (emphasis added).
120 Id at 63 (emphasis added).
121 Hamner, 224 F3d at 706-07.
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retaliation than for those whom Title VII primarily seeks to
protect, namely, victims of race-based, ethnic-based, religion-
based, or gender-based discrimination." 12 2  The Court's
explication that the protections of antiretaliation provisions
extend beyond "victims of race-based, ethnic-based, religion-
based, or gender-based discrimination" is compelling evidence
that colorable retaliation claims need not be of a type explicitly
mentioned in Title VII's substantive provisions.
At the very least, Burlington Northern provides no reason
why we ought to manufacture a distinction between substantive
claims that fail because the employer did not act with the
requisite severity, and substantive claims that fail because they
are of a type not contemplated by the statute. The Court, in
declaring that the antiretaliation and substantive provisions of
Title VII are not coterminous, noted that the difference in scope
is a consequence of the provisions' different purposes. 123 Hence,
the central question in analyzing the scope of the antiretaliation
provision must be whether the particular expansion beyond the
substantive provisions would serve the aim of the antiretaliation
provisions: maintaining unfettered access. Consequently, it does
not matter whether a substantive claim would fail because the
employer did not act harshly enough, or because the employer
engaged in a type of discrimination that is still permissible
under the statute. If legitimate claims may be chilled if a
retaliation suit is not permitted, then courts must allow
retaliation claims to go forward. Under the language of
Burlington Northern, the reason for the chilling appears to be
immaterial. The Hamner court was wrong to assign legal
significance to the distinction between severity and type. 124
B. A Slippery Slope?
Critics may assert that this is a slippery slope: If we extend
the scope of Title VII's antiretaliation provisions beyond that of
its substantive provisions, then literally any complaint could be
"protected activity." But I do not advocate a full-scale departure
from the Seventh Circuit's two-prong test: A plaintiff must have
a subjective belief that the activity she complains of is
122 Burlington Northern, 548 US at 66-67.
123 Id.
124 Hamner, 224 F3d at 706-07.
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prohibited by Title VII's substantive provisions, and that belief
must be objectively reasonable. 125 This Comment merely
advocates an expansion of the reasonableness analysis beyond
the confines of Title VII's substantive provisions in the context
of complaints about discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. Consider the following scenario: An employee
complains that his boss is harassing him because he watches
"Two and Half Men" every week. The employee is subsequently
fired, and he files a Title VII suit claiming his boss retaliated
against him for complaining about discrimination on the basis of
sex. The employee's belief that the harassment he incurred was
sex discrimination is frivolous; it is objectively unreasonable.
However, when it turns out that what an employee thought was
sex discrimination was actually sexual orientation
discrimination, that mistake is a reasonable one. Indeed, "a
reasonable mistake may be one of fact or law." 126 This particular
mistake of law is always a reasonable one, because of the "brittle
legal distinction" between discrimination on the basis of sex and
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 127 Hence,
reasonableness analysis checks back against any slippery slope
argument.
Additionally, the law provides two additional checks against
frivolous retaliation claims. First, a court must make a factual
finding that the employee has a subjective, good faith belief that
they were complaining about discrimination on the basis of
sex.128 This is a question independent of subsequent
"reasonableness" analysis. Where a claim very clearly has little
to do with sex (like the "Two and a Half Men" example above), it
is likely the employee did not actually have a good faith belief
that he was complaining about sex discrimination. The court can
dismiss the case before getting to the "reasonableness" prong.
Second, Thompson's "zone of interests" analysis prevents absurd
claims from going forward. If indeed "the plaintiff's interests are
so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes
implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that
Congress intended to permit the suit," then retaliation claims
121 Id at 705-07.
126 Moyo u Gomez, 32 F3d 1382, 1385-86 (9th Cir 1994).
127 Birkholz, 2012 WL 580522, at *8.
128 Hamner, 224 F3d at 706-07.
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that obviously have nothing to do with sex cannot succeed. 12 9 On
the contrary, because of the "brittle legal distinction" between
sexual orientation discrimination and gender nonconformity
discrimination, it cannot be said that retaliation claims based on
sexual orientation discrimination is "marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute." 130
C. A Brittle Distinction
This compels the question: Is the distinction between sex
discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination really so
brittle? One could argue that sexual orientation discrimination
concerns status, whereas gender nonconformity discrimination
concerns conduct. Additionally, critics may assert that sexual
orientation discrimination concerns behavior outside the
workplace, whereas gender nonconformity discrimination
concerns the way an individual comports themselves within the
workplace.
These arguments are unavailing. First, broad social science
evidence indicates that "sex" and "sexual orientation" are
heavily intersectional. 131 One's sexual orientation is a factor of
one's sex; indeed, "sexual orientation is measured chiefly by the
relationship the sex of the object(s) of one's sexual desire bears
to one's own sex, i.e., whether the object(s) of one's desire are of
the same or of a different sex than oneself."132 Sexual orientation
is absolutely dependent on sex; to divorce the two makes little
sense.
Nowhere is this interrelationship more apparent than the
law. Courts have had enormous difficulty distinguishing claims
of sexual orientation discrimination from claims of gender
nonconformity discrimination. "When individuals diverge from
the gender expectations for their sex-when a woman displays
masculine characteristics or a man feminine ones-
discrimination against her is now treated as sex discrimination
129 Thompson, 131 S Ct at 870.
"s Id at 870.
.s. See, for example, Julie Konik and Lilia M. Cortina, Policing Gender at Work:
Intersections of Harassment Based on Sex and Sexuality, 21 Soc Just Rsrch 313, 331
(2008) ("[G]ender harassment and heterosexist harassment are linked at a fundamental
level, both serving to punish deviation from traditional patriarchal gender norms.").
132 Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L J 1, 13 (1995).
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while his behavior is generally viewed as a marker for
homosexual orientation and may not receive protection from
discrimination." 133  Essentially, courts in parallel cases
concerning female masculinity and male effeminacy have come
to differing conclusions because of the inherent difficulty in
separating claims based on gender nonconformity discrimination
from claims based on sexual orientation discrimination. 134
Perhaps courts have had such difficulty because the
"markers" of gender nonconformity are the same characteristics
that co-workers and supervisors use to make assumptions about
an employee's sexual orientation. For example, in Dandan u
Radisson Hotel Lisle, 135 the plaintiff, who had not revealed his
sexual orientation to his co-workers, filed suit after a supervisor
criticized his "speech patterns and kinesics for being feminine
... nearly every day." 136 Nonetheless, because the court
determined that "the derogatory and bigoted comments inflicted
upon Dandan were due to his co-workers' perception of his
sexual orientation," the court rejected his substantive Title VII
claim. 137 Though the plaintiff was criticized for being an
effeminate male-criticism that placed the plaintiff's claim at
the heart of Price Waterhouse's gender nonconformity theory-
the court determined that he suffered only from sexual
orientation discrimination. 138
Dandan demonstrates that the precise facts used to
establish a gender nonconformity claim-here, statements
directly implicating the plaintiff's effeminacy-can also be the
markers that shape co-workers' perceptions of an employee's
1ss Id.
134 Id at 2 ("This is most apparent from a comparison of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
in which the Supreme Court held it to constitute impermissible sex stereotyping to
advise a female candidate for an accounting partnership that she should 'walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, . . . wear jewelry,' and go to 'charm school,' with cases upholding an employer's
right to fire or not to hire males specifically because they were deemed 'effeminate."').
Compare Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 251, with Dandan u Radisson Hotel Lisle, No 97 C
8342, 2000 WL 336528, at *1-4 (ND Ill Mar 28, 2000) (dismissing a plaintiff's Title VII
sex discrimination claim where a supervisor criticized plaintiff's "speech patterns and
kinesics for being feminine" because the comments were "due to his co-workers'
perception of his sexual orientation").
is. No 97 C 8342, 2000 WL 336528 (ND Ill Mar 28, 2000).
1s6 Dandan u Radisson Hotel Lisle, No 97 C 8342, 2000 WL 336528, *1-4 (ND Ill
Mar 28, 2000).
1s7 Id.
1s8 Id.
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sexuality. This has two implications. First, that the use of
explicit language implicating an employee's gender
nonconformity can in one instance be deemed sex
discrimination1 39 and in another be deemed sexual orientation
discrimination 14 0 demonstrates the inherent difficulties courts-
institutional actors experienced in difficult questions of law-
have in making this distinction. Employees, then, stand little
chance of being able to predict, ex ante, whether their complaint
concerns protected sex discrimination, or unprotected sexual
orientation discrimination. Second, if courts assign legal
significance to co-workers' perceptions, as the Dandan court did,
then this difficulty is compounded-the status of the claim
would depend on the co-workers' state of mind, an
unascertainable fact. In a world where employees are
unprotected from retaliation after complaining about sexual
orientation discrimination, this forces employees to make a
choice: complain, and risk lawful retaliation should the
offending supervisor have the requisite perception of the
employee's sexuality, or say nothing and take no such risk.
Burlington Northern's demand for "unfettered access" does not
abide such a choice. 141
Second, arguments that the distinction between sex
discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is clear are
divorced from the reality of current public perception. One
recent poll found that 69% of people believe that it is currently
illegal under federal law for an employer to discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation.142 In the same poll, only 13 percent
believed that federal law permits such discrimination. 143 While
this data is undeniably imperfect, it reflects widespread
misunderstanding of Title VII. To say that the line between
proscribed sex discrimination and permitted sexual orientation
discrimination is clear is to declare the vast majority of the
populace unreasonable.
Third, the minute distinctions between sex and sexual
orientation discrimination are overshadowed by their broad
similarities. Price Waterhouse and its progeny proscribe
19 Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 251.
140 Dandan, 2000 WL 336528, *1-4.
141 Burlington Northern, 548 US at 64.
142 Jagel, Poll Results: Gay Rights (cited in note 8).
143 Id.
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discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity. 144
Attraction to the same sex is one potential mode of gender
nonconformity, albeit one that lower courts have gerrymandered
out of Price Waterhouse's general rule. Nonetheless, the mere
existence of the "gender nonconformity" rule renders reasonable
the belief that Title VII's substantive provisions proscribe sexual
orientation discrimination, as such discrimination fits within a
broader category of proscribed conduct.
As a response to this, critics may maintain that we have
moved past the day when our expectation of an individual's
sexual orientation is tied to their gender. In this view, we no
longer make the default assumption that an individual is
attracted to males simply because she is female; notions of
gender identity and sexual orientation have been
"disaggregated." 1 4 5 From this proposition follows the conclusion
that there is no interaction between sexual orientation
discrimination and Price Waterhouse, because sexual orientation
discrimination is decidedly not a form of gender nonconformity
discrimination. 146
These arguments ought not have legal significance for two
reasons. First, expectations of heterosexuality remain the
norm. 147 Society tends to maintain the default belief that a male
is attracted to females and vice versa. 148 That default belief is
144 Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 251.
145 See Case, 105 Yale L J at 15-16 (cited in note 132) (footnote omitted) ("We have
come to realize that the categories of sex, gender, and orientation do not always come
together in neat packages. Not only are they not as binary as we might once have
thought, they can in fact be disaggregated. Indeed, the disaggregation of sex and
orientation is conceptually well-nigh complete. It should by now come as no surprise to
anyone in this culture, whatever his or her normative view of homosexuality, that being
male does not necessarily fix one's sexual orientation toward females; there are
unquestionably males who lust after other males, and we no longer tend to think of them
as a 'third sex' or an 'intermediate sex' because of this tendency.").
146 Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 251.
147 See Karin A. Martin, Normalizing Heterosexuality: Mothers' Assumptions, Talk,
and Strategies with Young Children, 74 Am Soc Rev 191 (2009) ("Heteronormativity
(Jackson 2006; Kitzinger 2005), of course, encompasses the many mundane, everyday
ways in which heterosexuality is privileged over homosexuality, taken for granted, and
seen as natural, ordinary, persistent, and without need of explanation. Jackson (2006)
argues that heteronormativity 'governs' both gender and sexuality and operates through
multiple dimensions of social life (e.g., structure, meaning, everyday practice, and
individual subjectivity). Heteronormativity is also normative in a moral sense, defining
what is within the bounds of'normal."').
148 See Joyce McCarl Nielson, Glenda Walden and Charlotte A. Kunkel, Gendered
Heteronormativity: Empirical Illustrations in Everyday Life, 41 The Soc Qu 284 (2000)
("For example, scholars refer to heterosensibilities (Epstein and Steinberg 1995),
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solely a product of the subject's sex, and it is a presumption that
requires the affirmative gathering of information to be
overcome. While we no longer hold hard and fast beliefs that all
males are attracted to females, individuals still hold heavy
presumptions of heteronormativity. The disaggregation of sex
and sexuality is not complete.
Second, even if the disaggregation is complete, Price
Waterhouse contemplates adverse employment actions taken as
a response to traditional notions of gender conformity as well as
modern notions of gender conformity. In creating the gender
nonconformity framework, the Court noted that "we are beyond
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group."14 9 Indeed, the Price Waterhouse
court makes consistent reference to "sex stereotyping" as
impermissible under Title VII. 150 Any reading of this
"stereotype" language that excludes traditional expectations
about men and women would create absurd results. For
example, society's expectation that women remain submissive to
men has obviously waned over time. It would be an exceedingly
narrow reading of Price Waterhouse, and one that is assuredly
inconsonant with Price Waterhouse's broad rule against
employer stereotyping, 151 to say that an employer who fires a
female worker for refusing to be submissive to a male co-worker
is not committing gender nonconformity discrimination. 1 52 This
construction deprives Price Waterhouse of all meaning. That
some societal expectations have shifted does not narrow the
protection Title VII affords against gender nonconformity
discrimination. Hence, the distinction between sexual
orientation discrimination and gender nonconformity
discrimination is indeed a brittle one.
heterosexual hegemony (e.g., Thompson 1992), heteropatriarchy (Ramazanoglu 1994),
heterocentricity (Kitzinger et al. 1992), technologies of heterosexuality (Gavey 1993), and
the heterosexual imaginary (Ingraham 1994). In various ways and to various degrees,
these terms capture the taken-for-granted and simultaneously compulsory character of
institutionalized heterosexuality. All are attempts to highlight an aspect of sexuality
that is rarely stated (i.e., that heterosexuality is the default option) and to underscore its
cultural dominance.").
149 Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 251.
"s Id at 250-52.
m5 Id.
152 Id at 251.
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Finally, critics may concede that the distinction is brittle,
but nonetheless point out that there are individual cases where
it is clear that discrimination is based exclusively on sexual
orientation and not on gender nonconformity. 153 From this may
follow the criticism that the proposed per se rule is
inappropriate because, in these exceptionally clear cases, the
employee's belief that the discrimination at issue is gender
nonconformity discrimination is unreasonable by definition.
This argument ought not prevail for two reasons. First,
because homosexuality could be viewed as a violation of our
traditional societal expectations for a man's or woman's behavior
independent of any other markers of gender nonconformity,
there is no exceptionally clear case. 154 Second, even if some cases
are clearer than others, only a per se rule maintains "unfettered
access" 155 to Title VII's remedial mechanisms. If a gay employee
has any lingering doubt that he may face retaliation should he
complain, he will be appreciably less likely to do so. 15 6 Only a
per se rule completely eliminates that lingering doubt and
minimizes the very real risk that legitimate sex discrimination
claims will be chilled. If "unfettered access" is truly to mean
unfettered access, then courts may have to abide cases where
they believe it exceptionally clear that a complaint was based
exclusively on sexual orientation discrimination.
D. ENDA and Existing Law
Finally, critics may assert that the existence of ENDA
necessarily means that Title VII's antiretaliation provisions do
not contemplate sexual orientation discrimination. An example
of this kind of argument is found in the Second Circuit's decision
in Kiley v American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals.15 7 In Kiley, the court considered whether Title VII's
substantive provisions protected employees from sexual
..s See, for example, Hamner, 224 F3d at 705 (quoting portions of the plaintiffs
testimony that make it obvious the discrimination at issue was exclusively based on his
sexual orientation).
114 See Henderson, 2013 WL 1352158 at *4.
1.. Burlington Northern, 548 US at 66.
116 See Crawford, 555 US at 279 (citing "fear of retaliation" as the predominant
reason employees do not file discrimination complaints).
117 296 Fed Appx 107 (2d Cir 2008).
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orientation discrimination. 158 In rejecting this notion, the court
noted "based on numerous bills attempting to extend Title VII
protection to sexual orientation . . . Congress did not intend to
include sexual orientation in Title VII's current form." 159
Opponents may argue that the same logic applies to Title VII's
antiretaliation provisions; because ENDA includes
antiretaliation provisions similar to those contained in Title VII,
it can be assumed that Congress did not intend to protect
individuals who complain of sexual orientation discrimination
when it passed Title VII.
This argument is also unavailing. While it is "well-settled"
law that Title VII's substantive provisions do not contemplate
sexual orientation discrimination, 160 the law is anything but
well-settled on the nature of Title VII's antiretaliation
provisions. It is entirely possible that the antiretaliation
provisions of ENDA are merely intended to clarify a current
ambiguity in the law, rather than make a statement that
current law does not protect those who complain of sexual
orientation discrimination. More likely, however, the Congresses
that have considered ENDA wanted to ensure broad substantive
protections for those suffering from sexual orientation
discrimination; it is unlikely that shortcomings of Title VII's
antiretaliation provisions are motivating ENDA's passage. On
the other hand, it is clear that Title VII's substantive
shortcomings are motivating ENDA's consideration. 161 This
distinguishes Title VII's antiretaliation provisions from the
substantive provisions discussed in Kiley. While the Senate has
likely acted to correct what it views as a deficit in Title VII's
substantive provisions, it has not done so with respect to Title
VII's antiretaliation provisions. Hence, the consideration of
ENDA does not provide evidence that Congress did not intend
13s Kiley v ASPCA, 296 Fed Appx 107, 109 (2d Cir 2008).
159 Id.
160 Simonton, 232 F3d at 35.
1' For example, Harry Reid (D-NV), Senate Majority Leader, stated upon ENDA's
passage in the Senate that "the time has come for Congress to pass a federal law that
ensures all citizens, regardless of where they live, can go to work not afraid of who they
are." Such language indicates that protecting status is the motive behind ENDA. This is
(admittedly anecdotal) evidence that Title VII's substantive shortcomings are motivating
ENDA's consideration. See Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Approves Ban on Antigay Bias in
Workplace, NY Times (NY Times Nov 7, 2013), online at http: //www.nytimes.com/2013/
1 1/08/us/politics/senate-moves-to-final-vote-on-workplace-gay-bias-ban.htmlhp&r= 0
(visited Oct 18, 2014).
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Title VII's antiretaliation provisions to cover those complaining
of sexual orientation discrimination.
Moreover, courts have not uniformly refused to interpret
existing law in a way that expands substantive rights even as
Congress considers legislative mechanisms that would achieve
the same end. For example, the Supreme Court made a number
of rulings expanding substantive protections against sex and
gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment amid state and Congressional
consideration of the Equal Rights Amendment. 162 The Court
conferred heightened scrutiny to sex-based distinctions despite
the existence of a pending Constitutional amendment that
would have explicitly done so.163 In fact, in Frontiero u
Richardson,164 the plurality noted that Congress's decision to
pass the Equal Rights Amendment was a powerful indicator
"that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious"
and entitled to heightened protection under existing Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. 165 Hence, the Senate's decision to
pass ENDA may actually be evidence that Title VII confers
greater protection upon those suffering from discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation.
III. CONCLUSION
Few political issues are as salient and relevant in
contemporary America as LGBT rights, and workplace rights
are at the heart of our national conversation. While Title VII
162 See, for example, Craig u Boren, 429 US 190 (1976) (striking down an Oklahoma
statute creating separate alcohol purchasing rules for men and women); Reed v Reed,
404 US 71 (1971) (striking down an Idaho law giving automatic preference to males in
determining who administers an estate); Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677 (1973)
(striking down a federal practice that denied benefits conferred upon wives of male
service members to husbands of female service members).
16s See Craig, 429 US at 197; Frontiero, 411 US at 687-88 (1973) (footnotes omitted)
("And s 1 of the Equal Rights Amendment, passed by Congress on March 22, 1972, and
submitted to the legislatures of the States for ratification, declares that '(e)quality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of sex.' Thus, Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon
sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is
not without significance to the question presently under consideration. . . . With these
considerations in mind, we can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like
classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and
must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.").
164 411 US 677 (1973).
161 Id at 687-88.
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does not provide substantive protection for those facing
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the
workplace, a recent circuit split has created an unclear
jurisprudence with regard to protection for employees who
complain about such discrimination. Recent Supreme Court
precedent suggests a broad construction of Title VII's
antiretaliation provisions is necessary to secure the goal of
"unfettered access" to Title VII's remedial mechanisms. As
applied to those who complain of sexual orientation
discrimination and face retaliation, this precedent requires an
elimination of the distinction between "sex" and "sexual
orientation." Hence, those who face retaliation after making
such complaints ought to receive the full protection of Title VII's
antiretaliation provisions.

